Compulsory Licensing and Administrative Procedures in Canada by Vancise, William J.
WILLIAM J. VANCISE, COMPULSORY LICENSING AND PROCEDURES IN CANADA, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 501 (2018) 
  
501 
Compulsory Licensing and Administrative Procedures in 
Canada 
 
The Honorable William J. Vancise* 
INTRODUCTION 
I have been asked to participate at this Symposium as past Chair of the 
Copyright Board of Canada (“the Board”).  For over a decade, I presided over the 
Board’s proceedings to set tariffs on the use of copyrighted material.  Although I 
am not an expert in intellectual property, I was fortunate to hear and decide cases 
including the transmission of music on the Internet, interpretation of the blank 
media levy, making available right, and fair dealing disputes surrounding licensing 
for educational institutions.  The Board decides more copyright issues than any 
other court or tribunal in Canada.  I propose to deal with the Canadian experience 
administering copyright with several compulsory or statutory licensing schemes.  
There are at least three kinds of “compulsory” licensing regimes in Canada:  (1) the 
private copying levy on blank recording media;  (2) the process of issuing licenses 
for “unlocatable copyright owners”; and (3) the mandatory filing of tariffs for the 
public performance or communication of music.1 
I. PRIVATE COPYING LEVIES 
The private copying regime is the quintessential compulsory licensing scheme 
for both compensating authors and composers, performers, and record producers 
for the copying of their music, and providing third party compensation to the 
consumers of the audio recording media on which copies are made.  This regime 
was introduced in Canada in the late 1990s and was initially successful in providing 
a tariff on the purchase of cassettes, recordable CDs, and minidisks, and then 
distributing the royalties to the collective societies representing rights holders in the 
proportion determined by the Board.  This system functioned well until 2003–2004.  
Technology, however, overtook the regime when the Canadian Private Copying 
Collective (“CPCC”), the collective responsible for administering compulsory 
licensing, requested a tariff for blank DVDs and—more importantly—for the 
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removable or nonremovable memory used in MP3 players.  In 2003, the Board first 
decided that the removable or nonremovable memory used in an MP3 player fell 
within the definition of an “audio recording medium” in the Canadian Copyright 
Act (“the Act”) and then established a tariff.2 
In response, objectors applied for judicial review to set aside the tariff.  
Although the objectors raised a number of issues, the most important one for our 
purposes was whether the removable or nonremovable memory should be 
identified as an “audio recording medium” when permanently embedded in an MP3 
player.  The Federal Court of Appeal reversed the Board’s initial finding, holding 
that Parliament did not intend private copying to include a recorder or similar 
device.3  In the court’s opinion, the decision to include MP3 players in the private 
copying scheme lay with Parliament, and not with the Court.  As a result, the court 
set aside the tariff and the Supreme Court of Canada denied appeal. 
The issue of the tariff was not, however, dead.  CPCC renewed its request for a 
tariff, this time on the digital audio recorder itself, rather than on the removable or 
nonremovable memory device.  The Board again found that a digital audio recorder 
(as distinct from the memory device itself) was an “audio recording medium” 
pursuant to the definition in the Act.4  Once again, the Federal Court of Appeal—in 
what I later described as “eight turgid paragraphs” with no analysis—overturned 
the decision of the Board.5  CPCC did not apply for leave to appeal because, as I 
am reliably informed, the Canadian Government at the time warned that the 
collective might face new legislation further restricting the private copying right if 
it persisted.  Indeed, this veiled threat came to fruition some months later when the 
Government issued a regulation explicitly exempting memory cards from the 
regime.6  Since then, the royalties for cassettes and CDs has consistently declined.  
Cassettes have been rendered obsolete, and the tariff for CDs is now CAD $.29 per 
CD.7  The private copying regime is nearing its starvation-induced death. 
Opinions differ over whether Canada’s compulsory license and levy scheme for 
private copying was a misguided policy or a model solution.  Rights holders had 
mixed feelings.  Those accustomed to collective licensing liked the revenue stream 
and the principle recognizing that even private copying had compensable value.  
Other rights holders, including record labels, gladly accepted royalties, but would 
have preferred a system giving them more control, like microtransactions facilitated 
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by digital rights management tools.  Canadian consumers and media retailers 
generally opposed the program on one of two grounds.  Either they used media like 
blank CDs for copying photos or data, but not music, thereby objecting to the cross 
subsidization.  Or, if they did privately copy music, they realized that this activity 
of “format shifting” was and still is treated as fair use in the United States. 
Just over a decade ago, numerous academics proposed ideas to license peer to 
peer file sharing based on a statutory exemption and corresponding levy to be paid, 
probably, by Internet intermediaries.8  These proposals, however, did not find their 
way into legislation mainly because technology and new business models changed 
consumer behavior so quickly.  Legal options for, at first, downloading, and later, 
streaming music gained widespread acceptance.  Online music stores and streaming 
services are now the norm in the industry.  Technological protection measures 
control access and copying.  The price of temporary or permanent private copying 
in the process is built into licensing and subscription fees. 
II. LICENSES ISSUED FOR UNLOCATABLE OWNERS 
I have also been asked to describe the orphan works regime provided for by 
statute in Canada.  Section 77 of the Act provides for a license for orphan works 
that are called “unlocatables.”9  The section is remedial in nature and meant to 
foster circulation of works and other subject matters protected by copyright while 
also protecting the economic and moral interests of the copyright holder.  The Act 
sets out a number of clear conditions that must be met before the Board, the 
administrative tribunal charged with administering the regime, can decide to 
exercise its discretion to issue a license:  (1) the work must be published and 
protected by copyright; (2) the intended work must be one contemplated by section 
3 of the Act; (3) the Board must be satisfied that the owner of the copyrighted work 
cannot be located and that the applicant has made reasonable efforts to locate the 
owner.  If all these conditions are satisfied, the Board may issue a license.  If it 
does, the Board can set out the terms of the nonexclusive license, including the 
amount that the copyright owner may claim after expiry of the license.  The Board 
has always viewed its role as that of stepping into the shoes of the owner.  This is 
not always easy.  Finally, the Board must always take into account general public 
policy and should not issue a license for any purpose that is contrary to modern 
Canadian society. 
The decision to issue a license usually turns on whether the work in question 
falls within section 3 of the Act.  In Breakthrough Films and Television, the Board 
articulated the principles that are used in determining whether to grant a license.10  
There, the issue was whether the work for which a license was requested was a 
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substantial part of the work, either quantitatively or qualitatively.  The work 
consisted of 325 words found on five different pages in a book of 354 pages.  Less 
than one percent of the whole work was arguably not quantitatively sufficient to be 
a substantial part of the work.  The second part of the inquiry, however, was 
whether the work was qualitatively a substantial part of the work.  The majority of 
the Board found this second prong of the inquiry satisfied and granted the license.11  
Since 1990, the Board has granted 297 licenses.  Only twelve applications have 
been denied with reasons.  Many applications are denied without formal reason, for 
example, if copyright was not required or the Board’s staff succeeded in locating 
the copyright holder. 
Critics have faulted this regime as bureaucratic and time consuming, with no 
demonstrable economic benefit.  Jeremy de Beer, Law Professor at the University 
of Ottawa, and Mario Bouchard, General Counsel of the Board, argue that the 
regime can work, but that it is resource intensive and time consuming to 
administer. 12   They conclude that the regime provides little payoff, and the 
bureaucracy stymies effective and efficient use of historical works like old photos, 
out of print books, and speeches.  As I will argue below, the system can only work 
if the agency charged with administering it is given adequate resources.  The 
Board’s administrative responsibilities regarding the unlocatables regime has been 
mostly overlooked in recent criticisms of its procedures. 
III. TARIFFS FOR PERFORMANCES OF MUSICAL WORKS 
A third type of mandatory filing of tariffs is found in part VII of the Act and 
applies basically to the Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of 
Canada (“SOCAN”) and Re:Sound (societies that collect royalties for the 
performance and communication of musical works, performers’ performances, or 
sound recordings).13  These collectives are required by the Act to file a proposed 
tariff each year.  This tariff filing system is “compulsory” in that, unless a tariff was 
proposed, no action for infringement can be started without the consent of the 
Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development (“ISED”).  Collective 
societies that administer rights other than performing rights in music—such as 
Access Copyright (which represents authors of literary works) and the Canadian 
Musical Reproduction Rights Agency (“CMRRA,” which represents reproduction 
rights in music)—have the option to file tariffs, negotiate private agreements, or 
commence lawsuits (if so authorized by their members).  For those societies, tariff 
filing is not mandatory.14 
 
 11. See Edutile v. Automobile Prot. Ass’n., [2000] 4 F.C. 195, para. 23 (Can.). 
 12. Jeremy de Beer & Mario Bouchard, Canada’s Orphan Works Regime: Unlocatable Owners 
and the Copyright Board, 10 OXFORD U. COMMW. L.J. 215, 238 (2010) (“Administrative efficiency and 
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 13. Copyright Act §§ 67–69. 
 14. Id. at § 70.1.  
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Some of the most important decisions of the Board originated from the 
application for tariffs by SOCAN pursuant to part VII of the Act.15  Among other 
things, SOCAN obtained tariffs for the use of musical works on the Internet 
communicated by telecommunication in the context of commercial radio 
broadcasting; the downloading and streaming of music from the Internet; and ring 
tones, previews of musical works, and satellite radio.  Access Copyright also filed 
tariffs under part VII and claimed royalties for literary works involving educational 
institutions and governments that directly raised the issue of fair dealing.16 
A number of the issues decided by the Board under part VII have resulted in 
appellate rulings by the Supreme Court of Canada.  Indeed, the five decisions 
rendered by the Supreme Court in July 2012, now known collectively as the 
“Pentalogy,” evidence the importance of the mandatory filing of tariffs.17  The 
Pentalogy fundamentally changed copyright law in Canada.  Now is probably not 
the time for me to express my profound disagreement with the majority decision in 
Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada, namely that a download is not a communication to the 
public by telecommunication.18  Surprisingly, the majority found that streaming 
was a communication by telecommunication to the public, notwithstanding that the 
technology is precisely the same as that for downloading.  I agree with the 
dissenting opinion written by Justice Rothstein and do not agree with the majority’s 
reasoning, which, as I have said, had a fundamental impact on copyright in Canada.  
For example, because SOCAN does not represent the reproduction right, it was 
required to payback approximately CAD $13,000,000 in royalties.  Some of the 
Supreme Court’s other decisions, such as Alberta (Education) v. Canadian 
Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), were equally disruptive.19  All of 
those matters originated with tariffs filed at the Board. 
IV. THE ART OF TARIFF SETTING 
Tariff setting is an art that requires the Board to make determinations about the 
amount of compensation to be paid to right holders.  The actual amount of the 
royalty is of course the fundamental reason for the decision.  The next step is the 
creation of practically workable tariff terms and conditions.  I remember the first 
time I was exposed to the tariff setting mechanism, which occurs after deciding the 
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issues in the case, but before advising the parties of the result.  The Board would 
consult with the parties prior to the actual release of the decision and prior to 
announcing the result in order to ensure its workability.  To me, this was a 
completely foreign process, but it worked. 
In a recently released decision dealing with “online music services,” the Board 
staff negotiated with the various parties for many months to establish a workable 
tariff.20  This was a particularly complex case with a number of parties involved, 
but any delays in setting tariffs cause frustration and lead to allegations of 
inefficiency and dysfunction.  The time needed to issue a decision is occasionally 
much longer than desired, contributing to criticism of the Board and calls for 
reform by bloggers, academics, gadflies, and entities dissatisfied with recent 
decisions.  In particular, entities responded negatively to the recent Re:Sound 
decision dealing with Internet music streaming services, and two other decisions 
dealing with the Access Copyright tariffs for the reproduction of literary works by 
governments and elementary and secondary schools. The resulting clamor was not 
driven by principle, but rather by that old adage of whose ox is being gored. 
I was most disturbed by Music Canada’s response to the Re:Sound decision, 
which attacked the Board’s credibility in the media and with Members of 
Parliament.  The President of Music Canada even wrote a letter to my successor 
imploring him to change the way the Copyright Board operated so as to “facilitate 
the prosperity of Canadian cultural businesses rather than impede it.”21  This is 
particularly rich coming from Music Canada, an organization that is a shill for US 
labels.  The same comments can be made about Access Copyright, which is 
extremely unhappy with some of the Board’s recent decisions lowering royalties 
payable to it under the tariffs.  Access Copyright went so far as to claim that recent 
decisions of the Board highlight the systemic dysfunction in the Canadian 
copyright landscape and need for legislative reform.  The problem does not lie in 
copyright law, but rather in Access Copyright’s business model.  Indeed, one of our 
earlier critics recently came to the Board’s defense and pointed out that the reason 
for lowering the tariff was not systemic dysfunction of the Board, but rather a 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding fair dealing.22  Various 
politicians, pressured and lobbied by various interest groups including Music 
Canada, have also criticized the Board for the length of time it takes for decisions 
to be rendered.  I recently dealt with some of these criticisms in a speech I gave to 
the Association Littéraire et Artistique International (ALAI).23 
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Approach to Fair Dealing, MICHAEL GEIST (May 26, 2015), https://perma.cc/XT8C-ZFXR. 
 23. Vancise, Speech Delivered to the ALAI Symposium:  The Copyright Board of Canada:  
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V. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT PROCEDURAL REFORM 
In response to the amount of noise and uninformed complaints created by these 
various bloggers and lobbyists, the Government proposed an inquiry into the 
Board’s operation.  On August 9, 2017,  ISED and Canada Heritage announced a 
consultation requesting comments on thirteen options for increasing efficiency and 
decreasing delays in tariff setting.24  Many of the suggestions originating from 
ISED are impractical and unworkable.  To date, stakeholders and interested parties 
have provided some sixty submissions.  There is no indication of when or how 
ISED and Canada Heritage will respond to the submissions.  In addition to the 
foregoing, section 92 of the Act mandates review of the statute every five years by 
a Parliamentary Committee, the next of which is set to start in November 2018.  
There has been no indication of the form or timetable of the review. 
In any discussion about recent criticism of the Board, one has to take into 
account historical changes in the institution’s mandate.  Let me be clear, there are 
things that can be done to improve the operation of the Board, but one has to be 
realistic in calling for change.  The legislative framework of the Board’s mandate 
has changed dramatically over the years.  Phase I and II reviews of the Act resulted 
in amendments in 1989 and 1997 that significantly expanded the Board’s mandate 
and responsibilities.  Those changes provided collective societies the option of 
negotiating license agreements with users or filing tariffs.  As a result, the Board 
has dealt with reproduction of musical works; reproduction of literary works; 
reproduction of sound recordings and performers performances; and media 
monitoring.  As part of the second phase, the Board also dealt with new 
neighbouring rights, the private copying regime, and educational rights.  Phase III 
culminated with the Copyright Modernization Act, which came into force in 
November 2012.  These amendments added new rights and exceptions resulting in 
a further expansion of the Board’s mandate and workload.  Among the new rights 
and exceptions introduced were the new distribution and making available rights; 
the addition of education, parody, and satire as allowable for viewing purposes; and 
the exceptions dealing with non-commercial user generated content, reproduction 
for private purposes, copying for the purpose of time shifting, backup copies, 
ephemeral copies made by broadcasting undertakings and certain activities of 
educational institutions.  All of this added responsibility was added without 
requisite funding to enable the Board to deal with the added workload.  Indeed, 
when my successor, Mr. Justice Blair, was appointed, the then Minister 
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congratulated him on his appointment and urged him to consider “within its 
existing resources matters that could help further streamline its processes as well as 
reduce the time to issue decisions.”  As I said, all this occurred with no added 
resources to deal with all the increased rights. 
With new business models have come new challenges associated with copyright 
administration in Canada.  Most of these challenges arise as a result of the 
aggressive attacks on the Board’s decisions.  Almost without exception, each 
decision is met with an application for judicial review.  This has been sparked in no 
small measure by the uncertainty in the standard of judicial review as a result of the 
Supreme Court’s departure from traditional deferential models and actions as fact 
finders in Alberta v Access Copyright.25  The Supreme Court’s actions have eroded 
traditional models of deference.  We are back to a system in which the Chancellor’s 
foot is the order of the day. 
As demonstrated by the Canadian experience, compulsory licensing and 
copyright administration schemes have worked, but only when certain conditions 
are present, which include adequately funding the Board to hire additional legal and 
economic support staff.  First, as the private copying saga demonstrates, there must 
be a consistent and committed approach to the regime and not one beset by political 
agenda and a refusal to amend the Act to accommodate technological changes.  The 
private copying levy worked as designed until there were changes in technology, 
government, and ideology.  The Conservative government preferred market based 
solutions rather than compulsory licenses and levies.  Politicians considered these 
levies taxes and were committed to not raising them.  Second, as shown by online 
music licensing, establishing a mandatory tariff filing regime requires the 
government to commit to administrative resources.  A statutory licensing scheme 
cannot function without providing the agency charged with administering it 
adequate resources to enable it to carry out its function in an expeditious and 
efficient manner.  While the challenge by Music Canada began against the rates set 
by the Board, its lobbying effort morphed into an allegation that the Board was 
dysfunctional.  The real problems are parties like Music Canada, who manipulate 
the copyright system, and governments that do not provide the Board with the 
resources it requires to do its job.  The provision of adequate funding would go a 
long way towards resolving the problem.  Bureaucratic intervention is not only 
unhelpful, but also will not improve the operation of the Board. 
 
 25. Alberta v. Access Copyright, [2012] 2 S.C.R. at para. 40 (Rothstein, J., dissenting) (“The 
application of these factors to the facts of each case by the Copyright Board should be treated with 
deference on judicial review.  A principled deferential review requires that courts be cautious not to 
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